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ABSTRACT: A digital image is a rich medium of information. The development of user-
friendly image editing tools has given rise to the need for image forensics. The existing methods 
for the investigation of the authenticity of an image perform well on a limited set of images or 
certain datasets but do not generalize well across different datasets. The challenge of image 
forensics is to detect the traces of tampering which distorts the texture patterns. A method for 
image forensics is proposed, which employs Discriminative robust local binary patterns 
(DRLBP) for encoding tampering traces and a support vector machine (SVM) for decision 
making. In addition, to validate the generalization of the proposed method, a new dataset is 
developed that consists of historic images, which have been tampered with by professionals. 
Extensive experiments were conducted using the developed dataset as well as the public domain 
benchmark datasets; the results demonstrate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed 
method for tamper detection and validate its cross-dataset generalization. Based on the 
experimental results, directions are suggested that can improve dataset collection as well as 
algorithm evaluation protocols. More broadly, discussion in the community is stimulated 
regarding the very important, but largely neglected, issue of the capability of image forgery 
detection algorithms to generalize to new test data.  
KEYWORDS: Image forensics; Image forgery detection; Copy-move; Splicing; Cross-dataset 
evaluation. 
1 Introduction 
Digital images are rich source of information in areas such as forensic science, medical 
imaging, surveillance, journalism, e-services, and social networking. On social media applications 
such as WhatsApp and Facebook 1.8 billion images are uploaded daily [6]. It has become much 
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easier to manipulate the content of images due to the availability of powerful image editing tools 
such as Adobe Photoshop [9], Corel-DRAW [9] etc. It is difficult for humans to visually detect  
such image modifications [9, 11].  
Figure 1 shows different ways of image tampering such as shadow removal, inserting fake 
objects, color filtering, image composition and illumination adjustment. An image may be 
tampered using the following operations: i) transferring an object or region from one image to 
another, or even to the same image; this is the most common type of forgery, and encompasses 
both splicing and copy-move operations, see Figure 2, ii) inserting fake objects into an image or 
manipulating an existing object to change its properties, iii) altering image parts related to lights 
and lighting. iv) removing an object or region from the image and hiding it.  
Fig. 1. a) The hand shadow from the top image has been removed on the bottom image [2], b) The balls in 
the bottom picture are not real, which are inserted using circle objects along with light interactions [3], c) 
The bottom image was filtered to perform color editing on some of the stone status [5], d-f) The cat in (e) 
is a composite of the cat in (d) and the leopard in (f) [8], g) The building was spliced on the field in the top 
image, and in the bottom, it had its lighting adjusted to match the composition [10]. 
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Due to increase in the number of tampered and retouched images, digital contents are 
nowadays not considered a reliable source of information. It is very difficult to have reliable and 
efficient image forensic methods, due to the advancement and sophistication in image 
manipulation operations. Image authentication without using any prior information is called 
passive or blind approach [9, 12-14] and has received reasonable attention in the literature due to 
its ability to find forgeries in images by exploiting the traces/artifacts  via modeling the artifacts 
of forgery (discontinuities and inconsistencies in the form of edges, lines and corners) left by the 
tampering process. These traces act as features for image tampering detection [9, 15, 16]. 
To construct a simplified and computationally efficient image forgery detection model we 
employ Discriminative Robust Local Binary Patterns (DRLBP) [17], which encodes the structural 
changes that occur in images due to forgery. During model construction, a real forgery example 
dataset is required to validate the model. For this purpose, a new dataset consisting of historic 
images that have been tampered by professionals is developed, referred to in this paper as the 
Forged Real Images Throughout History (FRITH). It is used to validate the developed image 
authentication process together with other existing image forgery evaluation benchmark datasets. 
This work has the following four major contributions. 
• First, a new dataset FRITH (see Section 4 for details) is developed to evaluate the image 
forgery detection method on realistic scenarios. 
Fig. 2. Examples of copy-move (a-d) and splicing (e-h) forgeries: a) Original image [1], b) Tampering is 
performed by copy and pasting a girl object in the same image to another location [1], c) Transfer mask of 
(b), d) Object street lamp is copied to another location in the same image [4], e) Source image [7], f) Target 
image [7], g) Transference mask of source image, h) Spliced image. 
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• Second, a robust image forgery detection method based on DRLBP and SVM is proposed 
to identify whether a given image is authentic or forged. Extraction of salient features are 
important for any image forgery detection system. Since the texture and contrast of forged 
images are different to those of authentic images due to structural changes after forgery, 
the DRLBP code is computed by assigning a weight factor () carrying gradient 
information to capture edge and texture information together. The contrast is high near the 
boundary of forged areas in the forged images; therefore, the voted bin value is expected 
to be high as compared to authentic images which provides additional information of 
tampering cues (edges). 
• Third, the proposed approach is evaluated on cross datasets (i.e. training and testing on 
different datasets) to generalize to new data in real applications.  
• Fourth, a thorough evaluation and comparison on a variety of benchmark datasets is 
performed.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related works on image forgery detection are 
reviewed in Section 2. The detail of the proposed technique is described in Section 3. Section 4 is 
about datasets and evaluation criteria. System parameters are described in Section 5. Experimental 
results are presented, discussed, and compared with existing works in Section 6. The paper is 
concluded in Section 7. 
2  Related Work 
  Over the last two decades, numerous works had been performed to detect different types of 
forgeries in images. Image forgery detection approaches are divided into active and passive (or 
blind) categories. Active approaches use detection of embedded watermarks or signatures to ensure 
the authenticity of images [18-23]. Such approaches are limited, because it is difficult to maintain 
prior information of such pre-embedded watermarks, signatures and secret keys [20]. Therefore, 
to detect image forgery without having any prior knowledge is an active research field. 
Inspired by the research in [24] for perceiving tampered human speech, Ng et al. [25, 26] 
proposed to detect image forgery by means of phase and magnitude features of images. The 
Columbia Image Splicing Detection Evaluation (CISD) dataset was used for evaluation [27]. The 
detection accuracy was only 72%, due to differences in the frequency characteristics between 
audio signals and digital images. High order wavelet features were passed to an SVM classifier for 
image forgery detection in [26] and they achieved 80.15% accuracy.  Wang et al. [28] detected 
5 
 
 
 
image forgery using the Gray Level Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM) of the YCbCr image. The 
CASIA v1.0 dataset was used for evaluation. The achieved accuracy was 90.5% on the Cr channel. 
Subsequently, Wang et al. [29] extracted transition probability features from the Cb channel, 
achieving an accuracy of 95.6% on a subset of the CASIA v2.0 dataset.  
A technique based on the modified Run-Length Run-Number (RLRN) was proposed by Zhao 
et al. [30]. He used chrominance components for feature extraction and achieved 94% detection 
rate. Muhammad et al. [31] decomposed Cb and Cr components using the Steerable Pyramid 
Transform (SPT) into sub-bands and extracted features using Local Binary Patterns (LBP) from 
these sub-bands. Significant features were selected and then passed to an SVM for classification. 
The Columbia Color DVMM dataset, CASIA v1.0 and CASIA v2.0 datasets were used for 
experiments. The best accuracies reported were 94.8% on CASIA v1.0 dataset, 97.33% on CASIA 
v2.0 dataset, and 96.39% on Columbia Color DVMM dataset. Cozzolino et al. [32] used dense 
features and achieved 95.92% and 94.61% detection accuracy on FAU and GRIP datasets, 
respectively. The datasets contain 48 and 80 authentic and copy-move forged images, respectively. 
Rota et al. [33] proposed a blind deep learning approach based on Convolutional Neural 
Networks (CNN) for tampered image classification. They used the CAISA v2.0 dataset for 
experiments and achieved 97.44% detection rate.  
Hussain et al. [34] evaluated image forgery detection using Weber Local Descriptor (WLD) 
and LBP. The tampering traces were computed from chrominance components using WLD and 
encoded as features using binary patterns. SVM was employed for classification. The method was 
evaluated on DVMM, CASIA v1.0 and CASIA v2.0 datasets. The impact of WLD and LBP to 
model tampering traces was thoroughly explored. The performance of the method was reasonable. 
Cattaneo et al. [35] performed experimental analysis of image forgery detection and used the 
approach of  Lin et al. [36] for JPEG tampered image detection. For tampering detection the 
authors in [35] estimated the image luminance quality factor and relative frequency of tampered 
blocks both in authentic and forged images in the CASIA v2.0 dataset and found that the images 
of the CASIA v2.0 dataset contain some statistical artifacts which can help the detection process. 
To confirm this, they first used the CASIA v2.0 dataset to evaluate the performance of Lin et al.’s 
algorithm. According to their experiments, the considered algorithm performs very well on the 
CASIA v2.0 dataset. Some variants of the original algorithm were then specifically tuned 
according to the characteristics of the CASIA v2.0 dataset. These variants performed better than 
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their original counterpart. Then a new unbiased dataset UNISA [35] was assembled and a new set 
of experiments was carried out on these images. The results showed that the performance of the 
algorithm and its variants substantially decreased, proving that the algorithm tuned on CASIA v2.0 
is not robust. 
Pham et al., used Markov features in DCT domain to identify whether a given image is 
authentic or forged. SVM was used for classification [37]. Experiments were performed using 
CASIA v1.0 and CASIA v2.0 datasets and achieved 96.90 % detection accuracy. The method is 
evaluated on limited datasets and focused only splicing forgery. 
Wang et al., in [38], proposed mass filter banks using fast Fourier transformation. The features 
were then fed to ResNet [39], to classify whether an image is tampered or authentic. Yan et al., in 
[40], proposed a method based on deep learning using CNN architecture. The model is trained on 
recolored and natural images. The method achieved 83.98% detection accuracy and evaluated on 
variety of recolored and natural images. However, evaluation is not performed on forgeries like 
copy-move and splicing. 
Review of existing image forgery detection techniques shows that encoding structural changes 
occurred in images due to forgery is still a challenge. The success of an image forgery detection 
method relies upon how it copes with the structural changes in forged images. In our experiments 
we explored LBP, WLD, and DRLBP texture descriptors and found that DRLBP models these 
structural changes well. A variety of benchmark datasets are used for evaluation in our 
experimental analysis. To ensure the robustness (i.e., the ability to authenticate images in general) 
of the proposed algorithm, a cross-dataset protocol is adopted, i.e., training and testing are 
performed on different data sets that have been collected independently. 
3 Proposed Image Forgery Detection System 
The architectural diagram of the proposed approach is shown in Figure 3. The system is 
composed of four major components i.e., i) preprocessing, ii) feature extraction, iii) classification 
model building, and, iv) testing using the trained model with cross data validation. The model is 
trained using an SVM classifier on a set of images (see model training component of Figure 3), 
then the trained model is used to test/recognize (see testing component of Figure 3) unseen 
authentic and forged images.  
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3.1 Pre-Processing 
Tampering traces are embedded in the form of edge irregularities [41]. Before feature 
extraction it is important to select an appropriate color space. A tampered image is shown in 
respective components of RGB, HSV and YCbCr color spaces in Figure 4. It is observed that all 
components describe the image content in detail except chroma components (CbCr), which 
emphasize the weak signal content (little image detail) of the image. In general, th  content of an 
image  is too strong to hide the tampering traces. Edge irregularities caused by tampering can be 
noticed in chroma components [41], therefore, this study uses the YCbCr color space.  
    
Forged Image R G B 
    
Forged Image H S V 
    
Forged Image Y Cb Cr 
 
 
 
After careful visual inspection of the bird’s contour in the Y, Cb and Cr components (see Figure 
4), it is found that plenty of image detail cover up the forgery introduced by edges in the Y 
component, while in Cb (or Cr) component the bird’s contour presenting the forged region is 
sharper than other parts of the image because Cb (or Cr) has little image content as compared to Y 
Fig. 4. Visualization of R, G, B, Y, Cb, Cr, H, S, V channels of a forged image, using RGB, YCbCr and 
HSV color spaces from left to right Row1 and Row2 and Row 3 respectively. 
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(see Figure 4). Therefore, CbCr components are considered instead of Y component for features 
extraction. 
3.2 Feature Extraction 
During forgery, edges irregularities are embedded, which disturb the texture of images. Since 
significant difference is present in the texture of authentic and forged images in the form of small 
variations, the key question is how to model these small variations. LBP encodes the micro 
structure patterns [31], but does not capture well the orientation and edge information due to 
ignorance of small pixel fluctuation and sensitivity to noise. To classify whether an image is 
authentic or forged, microstructure patterns are required to be encoded with the strength of 
orientation and edge information. The new DRLBP texture descriptor better represents the 
microstructure patterns by assigning a weight factor () carrying the gradient and texture 
information together. In this way, DRLBP captures edge irregularities and local changes by 
encoding the edge and texture information together. Due to this reason, DRLBP is used in this 
study. 
To explain how these changes are modeled an example of image forgery is explained (see 
Figure 5). In Figure 5a the white box region is copied and pasted into the black box region. The 
zoomed in view of the black box region after forgery in Figure 5c shows that the texture of the 
black box region after forgery is disturbed and artifacts of tampering (edges, lines, and corners 
etc.) are introduced. To hide these artifacts the forged image is post-processed using blurring (see 
Figure 5d). The zoomed-in versions of the black box region before forgery and after forgery are 
almost similar (see Figure 5e and Figure 5f) because tampering artifacts are invisible to human 
eyes after post-processing but are still present in the forged image. DRLBP texture descriptor is 
employed on the chrominance components of a given image to encode these structural changes 
due to its ability of combining edge and texture information in a single representation. The DRLBP 
histograms of the authentic and tampered regions are plotted in Figure 5g and Figure 5h 
respectively and show that the features are discriminative. 
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3.2.1 Computation of DRLBP Descriptor 
An overview of computing the DRLBP descriptor is given below, for details see [17] and [42]. 
DRLBP descriptor first encodes local changes in the form of LBP codes and then estimates their 
distribution considering the local gradient magnitude at the corresponding locations, i.e. the 
DRLBP descriptor encodes the local change considering the amount of change. First LBP codes 
with radius 1 and neighborhood 8 are calculated from the image and then the weighted histogram � of LBP codes is computed using the following equation: 
� = ∑ ∑ −=−= �( � , , ), = , , … , − .           (2) � , = { ,, =             ℎ  
where n (=28) is the number of LBP codes, i.e. the number of bins in the histogram,  is gradient 
magnitude of the pixel at location , , which weights the contribution of the corresponding LBP 
code according to the amount of local change at the pixel and M×N is the resolution of the 
chrominance component.  To remove the effect of the reversal in the foreground and the 
background, a robust weighted histogram � � is calculated using � as follows: � � = � + � − − ,    ≤ < .            (3) 
Fig. 5. a) Region to be copied (white box), Region to be forged (black box), ) Forged image, c) Zoom-in view of 
forged region  before post-processing, d) Post-processed forged image, e) Zoom in view of region (black box) before 
forgery, f)  Zoom in view of forged region (black box) after forgery and post-processing, g) Histogram of DRLBP 
descriptor of region (black box) before forgery (features value along x-axis and frequency along y-axis), h) 
Histogram of DRLBP descriptor of region (black box) after forgery.  
11 
 
 
 
Further, to enhance the discriminative effect of patterns, a discriminative weighted histogram  � is calculated as follows: � = | � − � − − |, ≤ <  .             (4) 
The DRLBP is constructed by concatenating the robust LBP and the discriminative LBP as 
follows:  � = { � � , �}.                      (5) 
After calculating DRLBP histogram from each channel ℎ {  ,  } of the given image, the 
DRLBP descriptor ( ) is calculated by concatenating the DRLBP histograms corresponding to 
channels  ℎ {  ,  } as follows: = [ , �].  (6) 
The descriptor  computes the overall distribution of changes occurred due to forgery without 
taking into consideration their spatial locations. The incorporation of the information regarding 
spatial locations of patterns into  further enhances its discriminative potential because forgery 
cues are of small scale and spatially localized. If features are extracted from an image, the spatial 
location of forgery cues may be lost. For this reason, we divide each channel of image into  
blocks (sub-images), , , … ,  each of resolution ×  such that ×  =  × . The 
descriptor   is computed from each block and all descriptors are concatenated to form the 
descriptor ℎ of each channel ℎ {  ,  } i.e., ℎ = [ ℎ, ℎ, … , ℎ]. In this way 
the  dimension of   for  or  is � + � × . Finally, the DRLBP 
descriptor representing the input image is obtained using (6). The whole process of the 
computation of   is  detailed in Algorithm 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 1: The computation of DRLBP descriptor of a given image. 
Input: RGB image I, the number K of blocks 
Output: DRLBP based feature vector  
Procedure: 
1. For a given image I extract chrominance components 
a. ℎ {  ,  } 
2.  For each ℎ { ,  }    
a. Divide ℎ into  blocks: , , … ,  
b. For each block , = ,  , … ,   
- Compute DRLBP histogram ℎ  
c. ℎ = [ ℎ , ℎ , … , ℎ] 
3. = [ , �] 
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3.2.2 Statistical Analysis of the DRLBP Descriptor 
To show that the DRLBP descriptor has the potential to discriminate authentic and tampered 
images, we give a statistical analysis of the descriptor in two different ways.  
First, we computed the pairwise distances for the three cases using the city block between (i) 
authentic images, (ii) forged images, and (iii) authentic and forged images of CASIA v2.0.  The 
cases (i) and (ii) represent intra-class distances whereas case (iii) represents inter-class distance ; 
Figure 6 shows the histograms of the three cases. Most of the pairwise distances for the intra-class 
cases (Figures 6a and 6b) are between 0.0 and 2.00 while those for the inter-class case (Figure 6c) 
are between 1.5 and 2.5. There is an overlap of approximately 6% between pairwise distances 
belonging to intra-class and inter-class cases. This indicates that the DRLBP descriptor has the 
potential for discriminating the authentic and forged images. The effect of the overlap is reduced 
when a kernel SVM is used for classification because the kernel computes the distances in a higher 
dimensional space where the patterns become separable.  
   
a b c 
 
Secondly, the effect of DRLBP descriptor is analyzed using scatter matrix based measure 
because of its simplicity [43, 44].  For this purpose, two scatter matrices: (i) within class scatter 
matrix ( ) and (ii) between class scatter matrix ().  and  are defined as follows: = ∑ ∑ � == − �̅ ( − �̅)� ,                          (7) = ∑ = �̅ − ̅ �̅ − ̅ � ,                                                    (8) 
where  is the feature space, is the number of samples in �ℎ class, �̅ is the mean vector 
for the �ℎ class, ̅ is the mean vector for all classes and  is the number of classes. The traces of  
  and  represent intra-class and inter-class scatters, respectively. The features are 
Fig. 6. a) Histograms of pairwise distances of DRLBP features of CASIA v2.0 dataset; (a) 
Pairwise distances within authentic class, (b) Pairwise distance within forged class, and (c) 
Pairwise distance between authentic and forged classes. 
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discriminative if the intra-class scatter is small and the inter-class scatter is high. Table 1 shows 
the traces of    and  of five datasets. In each case, the trace of  is high and   is small 
indicating that the DRLBP descriptor is discriminative (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Trace of  and  on DRLBP features of benchmark datasets. 
Dataset Trace of �� Trace of � 
CASIA v1.0 [45] 1.24 2.87 
CASIA v2.0 [45] 1.37 2.57 
CoMFoD [1] 1.48 2.21 
MICC-F2000 [4] 1.28 2.01 
FRITH 1.47 2.35 
3.3 Classification Model Training (Building) 
To identify an image as authentic or forged is a two-class problem. The process of training a 
classification SVM model is described in Algorithm 2.  
Algorithm 2:  Image Forgery Detection Model Training (Building) Procedure. 
Input:  �    is the set of forged/tampered images, ,   is the set of authentic images, c and  (gamma) are the 
parameters of SVM with RBF kernel, ,  ,      and   are minimum and maximum values of 
 (to handle misclassification) and  ( to handle non-linear classification) respectively. 
Output: Trained classification model SVM 
Procedure: 
1. for each image �  in � 
         Create features vector  for each tampered image using Algorithm 1  =  
Create labeled featured vector  by assigning label 1 to  
end for 
2. for each image �  in   
         Create features vector  for each authentic image using Algorithm 1 =  
Create labeled featured vector  by assigning label -1 to  
end for 
3. ←   ∪   L 
4. = ,  
5. for =    do  
6.  for =     do  
          Divide  into equally  folds =  
           for =  �o  do 
     Train SVM ,  on /�  to get model MSVM (c, g) % all training data  except ith fold �   
     Test MSVM (c, g) on fold �  
     Record the  on fold �  
          end for 
             = ∑ =    % compute average accuracy on k folds  
             if  >    
                  =   , � = , � =  
             end if 
 end for 
end for 
7. Fit the SVM ( � , �  model on training data  
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SVM [46], deals with two-class problems by its construction and provides better generalization 
among kernel based classifiers [47-49]. The SVM has a variety of kernel functions such as radial 
basis function (RBF), polynomial, and sigmoid kernels, etc. 
Experiments are performed using these three kernels to find an optimal kernel. Experiments 
for identifying the optimal parameters representing the classification is performed using individual 
dataset or combination of datasets. A cross validation (CV) protocol is used to divide each dataset 
or combination of datasets into k (10)-folds. The SVM parameters are tuned on the training 
examples (9 out of the 10-folds) and that parameterization is used on the remaining (unused) fold. 
Each time the testing fold changes, the parameters are recalculated using k-1 folds on k iterations. 
Finally, the average value of k iterations parameters is considered final value of the trained model. 
All experiments are performed using the standard Lib-SVM [50], because SVM finds an optimal 
hyperplane with maximum margin between the two classes [46]. SVM uses the posterior 
probability of classification score which is the signed distance of a sample point from the decision 
boundary. The positive score classifies the sample point as positive, otherwise it is classified as 
negative [51]. 
3.4 Pre-trained Model Testing using Cross Dataset  
Further experiments are performed to ensure the generalizability of the proposed image 
classification approach using the cross-dataset evaluation. In this process, the features of the test 
image are extracted and passed to the trained model to classify whether the image is authentic or 
forged.    
4 Datasets and Evaluation Criteria 
To build a reliable and robust image forgery detection model, training and testing on 
benchmark datasets is very important. We need authentic as well as forged images in datasets. 
Forged images should contain as many possible varieties of geometric and postprocessing 
operations as possible. Further, for testing a trained image forgery model on unseen images, a 
collection of real forged images is very important to ensure the reliability of the trained model for 
real practical applications. In consideration of the above facts,  description of carefully selected 
datasets for use in our research is given in the next subsection. Furthermore, to measure the 
performance of any classification model, a selection of appropriate evaluation measures is 
necessary. This is described in the subsection 4.2. 
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4.1 Datasets Description 
     Image forgery evaluation datasets are created using different cameras and image editing 
software packages. Publically available benchmark datasets: Columbia color DVMM (DVMM) 
[52], CASIA v1.0 [45], CASIA v2.0 [45], CoMFoD [1], UNISA [35], MICC-F220  [4] and MICC-
F2000 [4] are used to evaluate and validate the proposed approach. A comprehensive experimental 
analysis is also performed by combining different datasets with the aim that performance may 
improve by increasing both variety and sample size of data. Set-A and Set-B are combination of 
different datasets to analyze the impact of different formats, resolutions, geometric and post-
processing operations on image forgery detection. The datasets are grouped into Set-A or Set-B 
based on benchmarks, forgery types, postprocessing operations and number of authentic/forged 
images. Details of each dataset characteristics such as number of authentic and forged images, 
forgery types, file types, resolution, geometric and post-processing operations applied on images 
to make the dataset challenging are given in Table 2. An example of authentic and forged images 
from CSAIA v2.0, CoMFoD, UNISA and MICC-F2000 are shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Authentic (bottom), forged (top). a) CASIA v2.0: A bird object is copied, rotated, and then pasted 
to another location of the same image. b) CoMFoD: The white object is multiply cloned in different 
locations of same image. c) UNISA: In the forged image, the rock is spliced at the bot om right corner of 
the authentic image. d) MICC-F2000: in the forged image, an object is pasted at the right-hand side of the 
authentic image. 
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4.1.1 Forged Real Images Throughout History (FRITH) a new Dataset for Evaluation of 
Image Forgery Detection  
In the forensic literature, many publicly available benchmarks datasets have been used for the 
detection of specific types of image forgeries. These benchmark datasets have been developed for 
supporting copy-move and splicing forgeries, having specific file formats, resolutions, geometric 
and post-processing operations. For example, the DVMM dataset has uncompressed authentic and 
forged images of sizes 757 × 568 and 1152 × 768 pixels. The CASIA v1.0 dataset has authentic 
and spliced images of size 384 × 256 pixels. The CoMFoD dataset has 200 sets of images of size 
512 × 512, each set containing authentic and forged examples. Both authentic and forged images 
were post-processed to enlarge the size of dataset (10,400 post-processed authentic and forged 
images). MICC-F220 consists of 220 images, while MICC-F2000 contains 2000 images, all 2048 
× 1536 pixels. The existing benchmark datasets have been created artificially by academic 
researchers with a specific goal in mind, primarily for the purposes of testing their algorithms only. 
However, in most cases the forgeries are fairly crude, and made by experts with the intention of 
forgery detection. We validated that the purpose of applying post-processing operations is to create 
semantically meaningful forged images. To the best of our knowledge, the applicability of existing 
benchmark datasets to realistic scenarios is always limited. Therefore, a benchmark dataset of 
semantically meaningful forged images used intentionally for false propaganda or malpractices 
should be made available to the researchers for the reliable testing of image forgery detection 
algorithms. Therefore, a new benchmark dataset has been created and labelled as Forged Real 
Images Throughout History (FRITH), consisting of real forgeries including many famous 
examples [53]. 
The collection of forgeries in [53] provided the starting point of creating FRITH. However, 
mostly [53] just contains a single image for each type of forgery, and generally does not provide 
the source of authentic images. For proper evaluation of image forgery detection, we require a 
dataset consisting of both authentic and forged image sets. Therefore, we used the forged images 
from [53] as queries in an internet search and selected the best quality versions of the matches to 
provide both the forged and their authentic samples. In total, 224 historic forged images were 
collected. Among these authentic (untampered) versions of 155 forged images are also obtained. 
The dataset has many challenging characteristics such as: i) many images have been scanned 
as the originals were not digital, ii) the forged images contain a variety of image forgeries such as 
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copy-move and splicing forgeries by transferring objects or regions, forgery by inserting fake 
objects, manipulation of existing objects, forged images being post-processed using lightening 
effects, and image enhancement/ tuning operations. The FRITH dataset has enough variety of real 
copy-move and splicing forgeries, in addition to other types of forgeries such as fake objects 
insertion, false captioning, and image enhancement operations. In future versions, we plan to add 
more real forged images with their authentic ones. The dataset will be made available for the public 
usage and can be downloaded from http://users.cs.cf.ac.uk/Paul.Rosin/#data1 . Example images of 
FRITH are shown in Figure 8 and its detail is listed in Table 2. 
 
 
4.2 Evaluation Criteria 
Accuracy (ACC), true positive rate (TPR), true negative rate (TNR), F-Measure and area under 
ROC curve (AUC)  are widely used to evaluate image forgery detection techniques [54, 55]. We 
evaluate our proposed approach using ACC, TPR, TNR, F-Measure, and AUC with cross dataset 
evaluation. The evaluation measures are defined as the follows. 
Accuracy (ACC) 
Accuracy is the proportion of correctly predicted authentic and forged images and is defined as: 
 
1 A. Khurshid, S. Xianfang, R. Paul, S. Mubbashar, H. Muhammad, and H. Zulfiqar. "Forged Real Images Throughout 
History (FRITH) a New Dataset," 
Fig. 8. Examples of authentic (bottom) and forged (top) images from the FRITH dataset: a) A doctored 
image showing Jeffrey Wong receiving an award, b) Tampered image of Obama’s meeting with Iranian 
President Hassan Rouhani, c) The Boston Marathon bombing tampered photo showing less disturbing 
content, d) A digitally altered puddle of water made to appear as blood flowing from the temple of 
Hatshepsut in Luxor Egypt. 
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= � +� + + � + ��  × %.  (9) 
where True Positive (TP) is the number of tampered images, which are classified as tampered; 
False Negative (FN) is the number of tampered images, which are classified as authentic; True 
Negative (TN) is the number of authentic images, which are classified as authentic; and False 
Positive (FP) is the number of authentic images, which are classified as tampered ones. 
True Positive Rate (TPR) 
TPR also known as sensitivity (SN) is the probability of recognizing a tampered image as tampered 
and is computed as follows: � = = �� + � × %. (10) 
True Negative Rate (TNR) 
TNR also known as specificity (SP) is the probability of recognizing an authentic image as 
authentic and is computed as follows: = � = + �� × %.  (11) 
F−Measure  
F-measure is the harmonic mean of precision and sensitivity, and is computed as follows: � − = �� + �� + � .  (12) 
Area under the Curve (AUC) of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
The ROC curve is used to present the performance of the binary classifier. It plots TPR versus 
FPR for exclusive thresholds of the classifier significances [56]. 
Cross Dataset Evaluation 
Cross dataset evaluation (training on one dataset and testing on another dataset) is the ultimate 
evaluation to expose the weaknesses and ensure the robustness of any image forgery detection 
method. In our experimental analysis, the performance of image forgery detection is evaluated 
using cross dataset protocol. 
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Table 2. Datasets description used for evaluation of image forgery detection algorithms and cross-dataset validation. 
Sr# Dataset Name Authentic Forged Forgery Types Image Resolution Image Formats 
Geometric 
Operations 
Post-Processing 
Operations 
1 DVMM  183 180 Splicing 
757 × 568 to 1152 × 
768 
TIFF and BMP No Uncompressed 
2 CASIA v1.0  800 925 
Splicing and Copy-
move 
384 × 256 JPEG 
resize, rotation 
deform, and 
distortion 
blurring, JPEG 
compression,  
3 
 
CASIA v2.0 
7491 5123 
Splicing and Copy-
move  
240 × 160  
900 × 600 
TIFF, JPEG, and 
BMP 
resize, rotation and 
distortion 
blurring, JPEG 
compression,  
4 CoMFoD  5000 5000 Copy-move 512 × 512 BMP   
JPEG compression, noise 
adding, blurring, brightness 
change, color reduction and 
contrast adjustment 
5 UNISA  2000 2000 
Splicing and Copy-
move 
4928 × 3264  
6016 × 4016 
TIFF, JPEG 
scaling, rotation, 
and distortion 
JPEG compression, 
blurring 
6 FRITH 155 224 
Copy-move, 
Splicing, 
Retouching, False 
Captioning, Fake 
objects insertion, 
Image enhancement 
Variety of 
dimensions 
JPEG, TIFF, 
PNG, BMP 
scaling, rotation, 
shearing, deform 
and distortion 
uncompressed, JPEG 
compression, blurring, 
noise adding, brightness 
change color reduction and 
image enhancement 
7 MICC-F220  111 110 Copy-move 737 × 492 JPEG scaling and rotation 
JPEG compression 
8 MICC-F2000 1300 700 
Splicing and Copy-
move 
2048 × 1536 JPEG scaling and rotation 
JPEG compression 
blurring 
noise adding 
contrast adjustment 
9 Set-A 13474 13228 Set-A is combination of DVMM, CASIA v1.0, CASIA v2.0 and CoMFoD datasets 
10 Set-B 3566 3065 Set-B is combination of MICC-F220, MICC-F2000, UNISA and FRITH datasets 
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5. System Parameters 
To find the best parameters of the system we performed a s ries of experiments by considering 
different combinations. Cb and Cr components are found suitable  due to their better performance 
during experiments as also referred in methods [6, 29, 31, 41]. For calculating the DRLBP features, 
each component is divided into overlapped blocks with 20% overlapping rate. In the case of 
DRLBP, we found that the uniform (u2) LBP (maximum two bits’ transitions) with P=8 and R=1 
is an appropriate choice due to its better performance as referred in [17].  
The optimization of the SVM parameters was done using the training datasets, and we found 
that the RBF kernel had the best performance. The RBF kernel involves two parameters:  and . 
The setting of these parameters plays a significant role in classification. The parameter  is used 
to balance the model complexity by fitting minimum error rate. The kernel function parameter  
is used to determine the nonlinear mapping from the input space to the high-dimensional feature 
space [57]. Kernel parameters  and , were tuned using grid-search method, and found  =5 and = −5 best. Different k-fold cross validations (CV) such as 5-fold, 7-fold, and 10-fold 
were considered to best fit training data on classification model, and we found that 10-fold CV 
was most appropriate due to its lower sensitivity while dividing data for training and 
testing/validation for model fitting.  
6. Experimental Results, Comparison, and Discussion 
The classification accuracy of the proposed method on different datasets is presented in Figure 
9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Classification accuracy of proposed method on different datasets in terms of t aining on same 
dataset and testing on same dataset. 
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The results reported here were obtained using the optimal parameters values of the system. 
6.1 Comparison of Proposed Method Terms of Training and Testing on the same Dataset.  
In this section, the results of the proposed method and state-of-th art methods are compared, 
in terms of training and testing on same dataset (see Table 3) 
Table 3. Comparison of Proposed method with recent state-of- he-art methods in terms of training and testing on 
same dataset. 
  
Train and Test 
Dataset 
Approaches 
ACC 
(%) 
TPR 
(%) 
TNR 
(%) 
F-Measure 
AUC 
DVMM 
Proposed 97.52 96.67 98.36 0.97 0.97 
Alahmadi et al. [58] 96.66 96.33 79.09 -- 0.96 
Hussain et al. [34] 94.19 -- -- -- -- 
Muhammad et al. [31] 96.39 -- -- -- -- 
Rao et al. [59] 96.38 -- -- -- -- 
Pham et al. [37] 96.90 -- -- -- -- 
Wang et al. [38] 82.31 -- -- -- -- 
CASIA v1.0 
Proposed 98.96 99.03 98.88 0.99 0.98 
Alahmadi et al. [58] 97.00 98.24 97.07 -- 0.97 
Shen et al. [60] 97.00 -- -- -- -- 
Alfy and Qureshi [6] 98.65 98.80 98.39 -- 0.99 
Goh and Thing [61] 90.18 -- -- -- -- 
Hussain et al. [34] 96.53 -- -- -- -- 
Muhammad et al. [31] 94.89 93.91 -- -- 0.93 
Rao et al. [59] 98.04 -- -- -- -- 
Pham et al. [37] 96.90 -- -- -- -- 
CASIA v2.0 
Proposed 99.21 99.02 99.33 0.99 0.99 
Cattaneo et al. [35] 90.00 -- -- -- -- 
Alahmadi et al. [58] 97.50 98.45 96.84 -- 0.97 
Rota et al. [33] 97.44 96.16 97.44 -- 0.99 
Shen et al. [60] 98.00 -- -- -- -- 
Alfy and Qureshi [6] 99.00 99.55 99.65 -- 0.99 
Hussain et al.  [34] 94.17 -- -- -- -- 
Muhammad et al. [31] 97.33 98.50 -- -- 0.97 
Rao et al. [59] 97.83 -- -- -- -- 
Pham et al. [37] 96.90 -- -- -- -- 
MICC-F220 
Proposed 99.64 99.9 99.20 0.99 0.99 
Amerini et al. [4] -- 98.21 91.84 -- -- 
Wang et al. [38] 98.92 -- -- -- -- 
MICC-F2000 
Proposed 99.64 98.57 99.23 0.99 0.99 
Amerini et al. [4] -- 93.43 89.04 -- -- 
Wang et al. [38] 99.14 -- -- -- -- 
22 
 
 
 
The comparison shows that the proposed method has better performance on different datasets in 
terms of training and testing on the same dataset, and the proposed method is robust against 
different geometric and post-processing operations applied on forged images of these datasets. The 
reason for this robustness is the ability of the DRLBP texture descriptor to model the structural 
changes in images that occurred due to forgery. The results of the proposed method are also 
comparable with the method of Yan et al., [40] which is trained using CNN architecture. The 
proposed method best detection accuracy on the combination of different datasets is 99.10 %, 
while the method of Yan et al., best detection accuracy is 86.89 %.  
6.2 Comparison of Proposed Method in Terms of Training and Testing on Different Dataset.  
Usually the same dataset is divided into two parts for training and testing or an n-fold strategy 
is applied but on the same dataset. For successful practical applications, it is necessary to develop 
the model through the process of training/validating on one dataset and finally testing the model 
on another dataset acquired from different sources, which is called cross dataset validation. For 
this purpose, four state-of-the-art methods [34, 35, 38, 58] are implemented together with the 
proposed approach.  
Table 4. Comparison of the proposed method and other recent state-of-th art methods on cross dataset evaluation 
Testing Dataset results are reported. 
  
Table 3. . .       
Train and Test Dataset Approaches 
ACC 
(%) 
TPR 
(%) 
TNR 
(%) 
F-Measure 
AUC 
Set-A 
Proposed 99.10 99.20 99.18 0.99 0.99 
Cattaneo et al. [35] 92.88 93.74 92.03 0.93 0.92 
Hussain et al. [34] 97.37 98.28 96.48 0.97 0.97 
Alahmadi et al. [58] 97.50 98.45 96.84 0.97 0.97 
Wang et al. [38] 98.00 98.00 98.00 0.98 0.98 
Set-B 
Proposed 98.02 97.88 98.15 0.98 0.98 
Cattaneo et al. [35] 89.88 88.09 91.42 0.89 0.90 
Hussain et al. [34] 96.52 96.25 96.75 0.96 0.96 
 Alahmadi et al. [58] 97.50 98.45 96.84 0.97 0.97 
 Wang et al. [38] 97.41 96.00 96.57 0.97 0.97 
Testing 
Dataset 
Training 
Dataset 
Approaches ACC (%)  TPR (%) TNR (%) F-Measure AUC 
MICC-F220 Set-A 
Proposed 84.16 86.36 81.98 0.84 0.84 
Cattaneo et al., [35] 67.12 61.26 72.97 0.65 0.67 
Hussain et al., [34] 74.21 70.91 77.48 0.73 0.74 
Alahmadi et al., [58] 65.33 60.34 71.97 0.64 0.65 
Wang et al., [38] 82.61 83.63 80.89 0.81 0.81 
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A series of experiments were performed to analyze the performance of the proposed method 
on cross dataset testing. We trained the model on Set-A dataset and then tested it on the MICC-
F220, MICC-F2000, UNISA and FRITH datasets (see Table 4). 
 
Table 5. Comparison of the proposed method and other state-of-the-art methods on cross dataset evaluation, Testing 
Dataset results are reported. 
 
Table 4. . . 
Testing 
Dataset 
Training 
Dataset Approaches ACC (%)  TPR (%) TNR (%) F-Measure AUC 
MICC-
F2000 
Set-A 
Proposed 86.50 83.33 88.46 0.81 0.85 
Cattaneo et al., [35] 69.75 56.43 76.92 0.67 0.68 
Hussain et al., [34] 76.11 70.71 78.95 0.73 0.74 
Alahmadi et al., [58] 75.00 74.17 77.59 0.75 0.75 
Wang et al., [38] 83.05 84.13 84.16 0.82 0.82 
UNISA Set-A 
Proposed 77.46 85.00 70.00 0.79 0.77 
Cattaneo et al.,  [35] 56.25 60.00 52.50 0.58 0.56 
Hussain et al., [34] 67.50 70.00 65.00 0.68 0.67 
Alahmadi et al., [58] 68.05 72.00 67.90 0.69 0.69 
Wang et al., [38] 75.34 80.20 68.29 0.75 0.75 
FRITH Set-A 
Proposed 74.39 72.55 77.42 0.78 0.77 
Cattaneo et al., [35] 48.78 47.60 51.61 0.53 0.49 
Hussain et al., [34] 63.41 62.75 64.25 0.66 0.63 
Alahmadi et al., [58] 69.94 68.57 69.52 0.71 0.71 
Wang et al., [38] 72.93 71.15 75.24 0.75 0.75 
Testing 
Dataset 
Training 
Dataset Approaches 
ACC 
(%) 
TPR 
(%) 
TNR 
(%) 
F-
Measure AUC 
 
Set-A 
 
Set-B 
Proposed 81.27 81.10 81.45 0.81 0.81 
Cattaneo et al., [35] 68.54 68.25 68.83 0.68 0.68 
Hussain et al., [34] 72.29 72.03 72.54 0.72 0.72 
Alahmadi et al., [58] 73.92 73.30 73.45 0.73 0.73 
Wang et al., [38] 79.72 78.01 78.39 0.78 0.78 
Set-B Set-A 
Proposed 77.89 77.16 78.52 0.76 0.78 
Cattaneo et al., [35] 66.10 60.85 70.89 0.63 0.65 
Hussain et al., [34] 69.84 67.37 71.96 0.67 0.69 
Alahmadi et al., [58] 70.29 71.13 72.54 0.71 0.71 
Wang et al., [38] 76.98 75.61 77.25 0.75 0.75 
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To determine the robustness of the image forgery classification model, experiments were 
performed by training the model on the Set-A dataset and then performing testing on the Set-B 
dataset and vice versa (see Table 5). The cross-dataset performance of the proposed system is 
better than the state-of-the-art methods, which indicates that the proposed method has better 
robustness. 
Our work adds to previous reports using cross dataset testing, which is an important area of 
research and an important component in real practice where different images need to be classified. 
Our experiments with cross dataset testing showed that our proposed method achieved better 
performance than those of  [34, 35, 38, 58] (see Figure 10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Discussion 
The objective of this paper was to perform a comprehensive analysis of image forgery detection 
algorithms and the role of datasets used to evaluate these algorithms. We introduced an edge-
texture feature based approach for classifying authentic and tampered images. The novelty in our 
experimental analysis is that: i) we explored state-of-the-art texture descriptors and found DRLBP 
to be a robust texture descriptor, which models the structural changes occurred in images due to 
forgery using edge-texture features that incorporate information such as texture, boundary 
Fig. 10.   AUC comparison of the Proposed Method, Hussain et al., and Cattaneo et al., Testing 
dataset/Training dataset (MICC-F220/Set-A, MICC-F2000/Set-A, UNISA/Set-A, FRITH/Set-A, 
Set-A/Set-B, and Set-B/Set-A). 
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discontinuities and inconsistencies. ii) we validated our approach and four state-of-the-art methods 
[34, 35, 38, 58] by performing a series of experiments on publicly available datasets. iii) we also 
prepared a new dataset FRITH to evaluate an image forgery detection technique on forged images 
used intentionally for false propaganda or malpractices rather than datasets designed specifically 
by academic researchers. From the experimental analysis, it is observed that success of any forgery 
detection system depends on: i) modeling the artifacts of forgery in a precise way; ii) training a 
model on samples with as many as possible different types of forgeries, geometric transformations 
and postprocessing operations rather than increasing the size of samples in general.  
Detecting forgery that has been carried out by inserting a new object or manipulating an 
existing object is also a challenging task. Scene lighting and geometry parameters may help to 
detect such tampering. Experiments revealed that exploiting the texture of such suspected images 
may give a reasonable cue to detect such tampering. We recommend that there must be a large 
dataset containing object insertion and manipulation forgeries, such as FRITH (it has some 
examples of such manipulations), to ensure the robustness of an image forgery detection system 
in real scenarios. 
Erasing manipulations disturb the structural changes occurred in images due to forgery and can 
be traced by exploiting the JPEG compression artifacts, if the original images were compressed 
after such tampering. From a forensics point of view, forgery by means of changing the lighting 
conditions of an image is dangerous due to their potential of concealing forgeries. For example, a 
splicing forgery may be concealed by changing the lightening parameters, Again JPEG 
compression artifacts may help to find such traces. 
Image enhancement operations such as blurring (filtering), noise, contrast adjustment, are 
applied on forged images with the intention to remove low-level traces of forgery. We observed 
from experimental analysis by counting small pixel fluctuations and having texture information 
together with edges that it is possible to detect such traces because image enhancement operations 
only soften the edges, and not erase them completely.  
6.3.1 Failure Analysis  
The proposed method achieved good performance, however, is less effective for some cases. 
The proposed method and methods in [34, 35, 38, 58], failed to predict some real forgeries shown 
in Table 6. After analyzing the failure cases, it is found that texture and edges of the forged images 
contain a mix of colors from the foreground and background of the source image which still a 
26 
 
 
 
challenge. We will address such problems in future by exploring manipulation-relevant features 
using deep learning approaches. 
Table 6. Example images of failure cases of forged images from FRITH dataset. 
 
In this image text in the passport is manipulated and the image of the 
passport is used to gain some illegal benefit. The person in the image 
altered his particulars to hide the passport contents. 
 
The Polish subsidiary of Microsoft ran a version of a company 
marketing campaign in which the photo was altered by replacing the 
face of middle person. 
 
The image was August 2007 cove of the scientific publication Nature 
showing three aircrafts measuring atmospheric pressure. The top and 
bottom aircrafts are cloned. 
 
In this image the Swiss tabloid Blick digitally altered a puddle of water 
to appear as blood flowing from the temple to show terrorist attack at the
temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor Egypt. 
 
In the image lady Franken dressed up like a baby bunny, wearing adult 
diapers and clutching a fluffy white teddy bear is fake. 
 
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, a novel image forgery detection method based on DRLBP and SVM has been 
proposed. The chrominance components of an input image are divided into overlapping blocks, 
and then the DRLBP code of each block is calculated. Later, histograms of all the blocks of both 
Cb and Cr components are used as features. Classification is performed using an SVM. The method 
was extensively evaluated on individual and combined benchmark datasets in terms of training 
and testing on splits of the same dataset, and on different datasets (i.e., cross dataset validation). 
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The proposed method was evaluated using eight benchmark datasets: DVMM, CASIA v1.0, 
CASIA v2.0, CoMFoD, MICC-F220, MICC-F2000, UNISA, FRITH, Set-A and Set-B. The 
classification accuracy of our method is consistent across the eight datasets, and it has better 
performance than state-of-the-art methods due to the effective modeling structural changes 
occurring in tampered images by DRLBP texture descriptor. The results on combinations (Set-A 
and Set-B) of datasets indicate that the proposed method is robust and consistent under different 
post-processing operations, file types, and image resolutions (small, medium, and high). The cross-
dataset evaluation (training on one dataset and testing on another dataset) shows that the 
performance of the proposed method is significantly better than state-of-th art methods. DRLBP 
is an elegant texture descriptor to represent important features of image tampering and helps in 
classifying whether an image is tampered or authentic. Furthermore, the approach is robust against 
different geometric transformations and post-processing operations. Cross-dataset evaluation is 
the ultimate test to expose the weaknesses and robustness of any image forgery detection method.  
The results of this study are better than other state-of-the-art image forgery detection methods 
in terms of cross-dataset validation, there is still room for improving the approach to ensure the 
robustness of an image forgery detection method on unseen images. It is believed that the research 
community should adopt the cross-dataset validation procedure from now on. From the 
experimental analysis, it is considered that statistical artifacts of possible types of image forgeries 
must be presented by benchmark datasets to enable the development off a robust model. As future 
work it is planned to localize the tampered regions and tune the parameters using meta-heuristics 
methods to improve the cross-dataset validation performance. dynamic learning of the 
classification method when tested on unseen images is another plan for future research. 
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